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ABSTRACT
Any cooperative n-person game with transferable utility has
a noncooperative mode in which the players sellout of their po-
sitions to an external market of entrepreneurial organizing agents.
Assuming a market of price takers, this game of competitive self-
valuation always has an equilibrium price solution. Every core
imputation in the original game constitutes a set of equilibrium
prices. If there is no core the entrepreneurs can exploit the
coalitions for a profit, i.e., they realize a positive rent for
their organizing function. Application is made to determining
fair wages to labor, and finding equilibrium prices for legislators
selling their votes.
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In this paper we describe a new approach to the valuation
of n-person cooperative games with transferable utility. The
idea is that values are determined competitively by creating a
"market" for the players (or for the players' positions).
Specifically, if value in the game is transferable, then outside
entrepreneurs will view potential combinations of players as a
source of potential profits. In such an environment any pro-
posed valuation of the players will be seen as a set of prices
by the entrepreneurs, who can acquire control of coalitions by
paying these prices or more. It is natural then to ask whether
a given valuation is in equilibrium, i.e. whether, given the
others' prices, a player could charge more (or less) and do
better.
The conclusion is that, in the face of profit maximizing
price-takers, an equilibrium in pure strategies always exists
in which every player gets what he asks. These valuations are
called "market values." It turns out that every core imputation
is a market value. On the other hand if the core does not exist
the players will not be able to divide the whole value of the
game and the entrepreneurs realize a "rent" from their contribu-
tion as organizers. In other words, the nonexistence of the
core means that in a sense the players can be "exploited" due
to their inability to cooperate.
We now define these ideas more precisely and illustrate
with two applications: the 'fair wage' problem, and 'political
bribery I.
It is useful to think of a cooperative game with transfer-
able utility as a production process. The players {1,2, ... ,n}
= N are the factors, and their joint payoff is what they can
produce. Then, the production function is simply the character-
istic function of the game, v. We make the following assumptions
on v:
(1) Free disposal: v(S) ｾ 0 for all S eN and veep) = 0
(2) Joint production: v(S UT) > v(S) + veT) whenever S ""IT = ep •
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Conversely, given any production function satisfying (1)
and (2) on factor set N, v may be interpreted as a game by sup-
posing that each factor i is represented by some agent who is a
player. For the present we assume that distinct factors are
identified with distinct players. However, it is also possible
within this framework to treat the case where a player simulta-
neously represents several different factors (see the fair wage
problem below) .
Now suppose that there is a market of outside agents or
entrepreneurs who are potential buyers: their role is to buy up
sets of factors and cause them to produce effectively. The
problem is to determine what constitutes a fair wage or vaLue
for the individual factors.
We propose the following answer. Let each player (i.e.,
factor representative) announce what he thinks he is worth: thus,
each i quotes a price Pi ｾ O. Now let the potential buyers
arrive. Each of them perceives the same production function, v,
and has an unlimited budget. We suppose that they arrive in some
order and take the prices as given. The first buyer in line will
then buy some set that maximizes his potential profit, v(S) -
LPi. Typically there will only be one such maximum profit set;
S
however, in case of ties a specific tie-breaking rule must be used.
We say that the tie-breaking rule is efficient if whenever T* is
the set of factors bought at prices e then v(T*) > v(T) for all
maximum profit sets T.
Now define the seLL-out game as follows: for strategies
p = (P1,P2, ... ,Pn) the payoff to i is
(3 ) "1'. (p)
1 =
p. if i is bought
1
v(i) otherwise
A vector e is a strong equiLibrium for this game if no
collection of players can simultaneously change their strategies
and all do better (assuming the others hold fast). It may then
be shown [Young, 1978d]:
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For any efficient tie-breaking rule 3 a strong equilibrium
in pure strategies always exists. ｍ ｯ ｲ ･ ｯ ｶ ･ ｲ ｾ there is always a
strong equilibrium p in which each player receives what he asks.
Any such p is called a market value for v. The class of
market values is the set of n-vectors p > 0 with the following
two properties [Young, 1978d]:
(4)
( 5)
N is a maximum profit set with respect to p
no factor i is in every maximum profit set with
respect to p
A simple example will illustrate these ideas. Three laborers
may be organized in different combinations to produce a divis-
ible output. The outputs of the different combinations are
shown below, where the larger combinations exhibit the advantages
of a division of labor, and not all laborers are equally skilled.
v (ep) = 0
v (1 ) = 6 v(1,2) = 27
v (2) = 7 v(1,3) = 29
v (3) = 8 v(2,3) = 32
v(1,2,3) = 40
There is a unique vector p satisfying conditions (4) and
(5), namely P1 = 8, P2 = 11, P3 = 13. These are the wages (in
units of output) that one might expect to see if the laborers
are unable to organize to produce by themselves, and if there
are outside entrepreneurs who compete for control.
Notice that each laborer's wage is greater than the amount
he can produce in isolation, as it should be. But the sum of all
wages is less than the total output, meaning that the entre-
preneur realizes a profit of eight units. At prices p there are
several combinations of factors that are equally profitable:
each of the sets {1,2}, {1,3}, {2,3}, and {1,2,3} would yield a
profit of 8 units to an organizer. For equilibrium to hold, the
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tie must be broken efficiently, i.e., by employing the set with
highest output, namely {1,2,3}. An explanatory mechanism for
this outcome is to ｩ ｭ ｡ ｧ ｩ ｮ ｾ that each of the laborers shades his
asking price by a small amount £i then {1,2,3} is the unique most
profitable set. Thus an efficient ｴ ｩ ･ Ｍ ｢ ｲ ｾ ｡ ｫ ｩ ｮ ｧ rule has the
property that it exhibits continuous behavior of the outcome as
the equilibrium is approached from below.
There is an important relation between the class of market
values and the core. In fact, every imputation in the core is a
market value. To see this, consider the conditions for a core
imputation: ｅ ｰ ｩ ｾ v(S) for all SCN and EPi= v(N). This saysS- N
that no set is profitable and the set N yields zero profit.
Thus condition (4) is satisfied. But so also is (5), since the
empty set is also a maximum profit set in this case.
If the core is empty, however, then there are no strong
equilibrium prices that permit the players to divide the whole
value of the game. In this situation an outside entrepreneur
will always be able to realize a surplus. This fact is illus-
trated in the following application.
A Fair Wage Problem
Let 1,2, ... ,n designate laborers who are available for hire
by entrepreneurs. The laborers have different skills, and each
combination ScN has a potential productive value v(S) (in, say,
units of output). We assume that joint production is possible,
e.g., is not prevented by ･ ｸ ｯ ｾ ･ ｮ ｯ ｵ ｳ fixed factors of produc-
tion.
Instead of trying to undercut each other, suppose the
laborers form a union to set their wages jointly. Then the union
representative has the problem of finding a wage structure w1 '
... ,wn that maximizes the return to labor. The employer has the
problem of hiring a set of laborers that will maximize his profits.
If there is only one potential employer and the union is in a
position to call a general strike then this is a bargaining
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problem. However, suppose instead that there are other poten-
tial employers, and that the union does not feel itself strong
enough internally to risk calling a general strike. (This is
likely to be the case if v has no core). The primary employer
can then be expected to act as a price taker: faced with a set
of wage demands w1 ,w2 , ... ,wn he employs some corobination S
yielding maximum profits and walks away from the rest. On the
other hand the union representative must face the possibility
that if wages are set too high, some laborers will go unemployed.
The real wage of such unemployed laborers will then be whatever
they are paid by the union as unemployment compensation. More-
over this compensation must come out of the other ｷ ｯ ｲ ｾ ･ ｲ ｳ ｬ wages.
Hence the real wage structure w1 ,w2 , ... ,wn is only sustainable
if all are employed at these wages, that is, only if N is a
maximum profit set at wages ｾ Ｎ
The union representative therefore solves the problem
(6 ) max I w.
N 1
subject to
v(N) - I w. > v(S) - Lw.
N 1 S 1
for all SeN
An optimal solution ｾ Ｊ to (6) always exists. By definition,
N is a maximum profit set under w*. Moreover, if some factor i
were in every maximum profit set, then wf could be increased and
1
N would still be a maximum profit set, a contradiction. There-
fore every optimal solution satisfies conditions (4) and (5),
hence is a market value for v. These are called the core market
values for v.
A core market value ｾ Ｊ represents a wage structure that
yields the highest total return to the factors, and the least
profit to the entrepreneurs. This profit, n* = v(N) - ｌｗｾ
N 1
is called the exploitable surplus of the game v. A positive
exploitable surplus exists if and only if v has no core. If v
has a core then the set of core market values equals the core.
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The meaning of (6) becomes clearer if we re-write it as
follows:
(7) min 7f
subject to
Lw. > v(S) - 7f
S 1
all seN
Lw. = v(N) - 7f
N 1
This says that the ･ ｸ ｰ ｬ ｯ ｪ ｾ ｡ ｢ ｬ ･ surplus represents the least
amount that must be skimmed off the value of all coalitions for
the core to first appear, and the core market values are pre-
cisely the imputations in the core of the game that is "left
over." While this notion bears a certain formal similarity to
the "least core," the values it gives, and their interpretation,
are quite different.
The existence of an exploitable surplus was predicated on
the assumption that the union did not consider a general strike
as a viable option. If this were an option, then it would appear
that they could ask for any wages such that L wi = v (N) and, be-
N
cause of competition among the entrepreneurs, they will all be
assured of employment. However this argument is only plausible
if w is in the core. If w is not in the core, then for some S
V(S) - LWi > O. But then an entrepreneur could bid away S by
S
offering them higher wages and still make a profit, and the
strike would collapse. Thus if the core does not exist, a strike
is vulnerable and one can expect to observe exploitable surplus
for the entrepreneur and a core market value for the wage struc-
ture. On the other hand, if the core does exist, the core
market values coincide with the core.
Political Bribery
In the sell-out game (3), it was assumed in the definition
of the' payoff function that player i gets v (i) -- the amount he
can "produce by himself" --even if he is not bought. However,
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this hypothesis overlooks two points. The first is the possibil-
ity that v(i) does not represent value that i can obtain acting
alone, but rather, is value that i's actions have to someone else.
The second point is, that i may incur an opportunity cost by
selling out; that is, there may be an inherent value to i in not
selling out which is different from v(i). Both of these situ-
ations require an appropriate modification of the payoff function
(3), and both arise in the following model of political bribery.
A legislature may be thought of as a production process in
which the legislators are the factors, voting is the process,
and legislation the output. This output is valuable, --not
generally to the legislators themselves -- but to outside inter-
est groups having a stake in the legislation. Moreover it is
not too far-fetched to say that there exist entrepreneurs who
might try to organize the factors to produce in a certain way--
namely, lobbyists representing these interest groups.
Suppose a lobbyist proposes a special-interest bill having
potential value M, and to pass it he will need to bribe a winning
coalition of the legislature. The production function for this
"legislative game" is easily given:
M if S is a winning coalition
v(S) =
o if S is a losing coalition
Notice that value in this game does not accrue directly
to the legislators. However,even though v(i) in such a game is
typically zero, the opportunity cost to i of selling out may
well be positive, since selling oneself may involve certain risks
or perhaps even pangs of conscience.
Let p? represent the opportunity cost to legislator i of
1
selling out, that is, the minimum price needed to get him to go
along with the bill. If the legislators all have equal votes
and are arranged in increasing order of p?, then we have a
1
monotone increasing "supply curve" for votes as shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1.
If the lobbyist knew the supply curve he could engage in
price discrimination and, moving up from the low end of the curve,
pay just enough to each voter until he secured a majority. But
in this context it may be difficult, if not impossible, for the
lobbyist to gain much knowledge of the supply curve. 1)
Suppose instead that he acts as a price taker. Then the
payoff function for the sell-out game is the following modified
form of (3): i gets his asking price Pi if he is bought, and p?
otherwise. 2) In this case the voters at the low end of the ｣ ｵ ｾ ｶ ･
1)In addition, there may well be competition from other
lobbyists who are proposing other bills for this same slot on
the agenda.
2)In an earlier version of this model [Young,1978a], the
payoff function was defined only in terms of direct payments to
the players: thus i's payoff was p. if i is bought and zero
otherwise. Also, the value of the1bill, M, was treated as in-
finite. These differences lead in some cases to slightly differ-
ent equilibrium solutions than obtain in the present model. They
also result in a distinction between "price" and "income" which
is not necessary if opportunity costs are treated as indirect
income. In the earlier version the term 'canonical equilibrium'
was used instead of 'core market value'.
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can strategically raise their prices, and command a surplus.
If a majority of k is required to win, ¥ < k < n, and M is suf-
ficiently large (11 ｾ k ｐｾＫＱＩ then each ,of the first k players can
raise his price to p = Pk+1' the opportunity cost of the (k+1)st
player; moreover these prices, (P' ... Ｇ ｐ Ｇ ｐ ｾ Ｋ Ｒ Ｇ ... Ｇ ｐ ｾ Ｉ Ｇ constitute
the unique market value for the sell-out game. The lobbyist's
demand curve is a "spike" of height M at voter k+1, and his
profit of M-kp represents ordinary economic surplus. (Figure 2).
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This model of political bribery was first described in
[Young, 1978a] where a theorem relating market value to marginal
values is given for the case of weighted majority games. Var-
ious other approaches to competitive bribery may be found in
[Young, 1978b, 19 78c], [Shubik and Young, 1978], and [Shubik and
Weber, 1978].
Both of the above examples illustrate the proposition that
a game without a core may be exploited for profit. Moreover it
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is precisely this exploitation that introduces stability into
the system, since the removal of surplus allows a core to exist
on what is "left over." Put another way, such a game may be
extended to include entrepreneurs, and this intended game al-
ways does have a core [Young, 1978d]. While the players in the
original game dO,not split all the proceeds, thus violating
Shapley's "efficiency" axiom [1953], this does not in fact imply
that production is inefficient. On the contrary, full value
v(N) is achieved, but outside entrepreneurs realize a surplus
from their ability to exploit what might otherwise have been an
inefficient solution.
Actually, a truly monopolistic agent would be able to real-
ize a surplus of up to v(N). Here we have studied the case where
there is a "primary" entrepreneur who is forced to be a price
taker because of potential competition from other entrepreneurs
standing behind him, or (as in the case of political bribery)
because price discrimination may not be possible for lack of in-
formation. This approach gives a "conservative" estimate on how
much surplus the entrepreneurs can skim off, (the "exploitable
surplus") and the imputations in the core of what is left over
(the "core market values") give the most optimistic picture of
what the players in such a game can hope to achieve.
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